In the Image of the Truth: A Discourse Analysis of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Introduction

Tensions between Israel and Palestine are always noticeable. Since Israel was established in 1948, there has been constant strife over land ownership and governance. Civilians have been pitted against each other as they have been forced to choose to adopt an identity. Once the lines were drawn, each side came out to defend its territory and nationality to the bitter end. This animosity allowed for ultranationalist behavior to fester, and eventually manifest itself in the form of terrorist groups and settler groups. Each extreme group functions because of its ability to garner support through ultranationalism, and has led to gruesome acts of violence on both sides.

This tension and ultranationalist behavior seemed to come to a head on June 12, 2014 when three yeshiva students named Eyal Yifrach, Naftali Fraenkel, and Gilad Shaar were kidnapped in the West Bank. A tremendous search was undertaken, and after eighteen days, their bodies were discovered buried under a pile of rocks. It was supposed that two Hamas terrorists—Marwan Qaswameh and Amer Abu Aisha—were responsible. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the triple kidnapping and homicide by saying “They were kidnapped and murdered in cold blood by beasts…Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay” (Rudoren and Kershner, 2014), sparking intense Israeli backlash against Hamas and Palestinians generally. Almost immediately after these men were held responsible, the IDF bombed the homes of these men. Yet to the most ultranationalist Israelis, this revenge was not strong enough.

Not long after the Israeli teens were murdered, three Israeli men decided to take revenge on Hamas. They kidnapped and subsequently burnt alive a sixteen-year-old Palestinian boy—Muhammad Abu Khdeir. When the men were arrested by Israeli police for the crime, they openly admitted that they did it to retaliate against Hamas for the murder of the yeshiva boys (Al Jazeera, 2016). However, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a public statement about the murder of Muhammad Abu Khdeir, he said “I promise you that we will bring the full force of the law to bear against the perpetrators of this horrific crime, which deserves every sort of condemnation and rejection” but that “This is a difference between us and our neighbors. There, murderers are received as heroes, and city squares are named in their honor” (Gur, 2014). The language used by Netanyahu would likely incite Israelis to hate Palestinians. He describes Palestinians as essentially being savages and Israelis as upholders of the law and innocent victims, creating a storyline for Israelis that further deteriorates interethnic relations with Palestinians at every level.

Ultranationalist behavior within Israel and Palestine has led to human rights violations on both sides as each side tries to garner support for its own nationality and state (or polity). Jewish Israelis feel empowered by rhetoric of politicians and the military campaigns being carried out for the defense of the Israeli homeland, leading Jewish Israelis to commit crimes against the group that is being labeled (either explicitly or implicitly) as inferior. These crimes usually come in the form of human rights violations. In response, Palestinians retaliate and commit their own human rights violations against Israelis.

To try to get both sides to understand each other and lessen the violence, NGOs dedicated to the protection of human rights have sprouted up in both Israel and Palestine. They usually work to document the crimes committed and work to educate the public on these violations. Yet since some are Jewish Israeli-based (B’Tselem) and others are Palestinian-based (Al-Haq), it is likely that their discourse on the violations and the reporting of various violations is different. It would be somewhat unsurprising if the Israeli-based NGO was slightly more conservative and apologetic in its reporting, especially after the start of Operation Protective Edge. It would also be somewhat unsurprising if the Palestinian-based NGO was slightly more inflammatory and finger-pointing in its reporting, especially after Operation Protective Edge, since most of the human rights violations are committed against Palestinians.

It seems impossible for these NGOs to forgo their identities even though they are professional organizations that are supposed to work for what would end up being the betterment of everyone involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It raises many questions about how these organizations deal with personal identities and biases. Do they differ in their discourses during times of peace and times of conflict? How has the discourse towards human rights changed within these NGOs since the launch of Operation Protective Edge in 2014? Does the reporting differ in terms of language used as well as incidents reported? In other words, does one NGO report different human rights violations than another?

Divided by Lines in the Sand

It is painfully obvious that without identity, we feel lost. When our identities are marginalized, we feel out of place. No person wants to have their identity marginalized, and when one has a national identity, one is likely to feel proud of it. When one’s national identity is threatened, or marginalized, by another, one is likely to try to defend it at any cost. Other scholars that have studied this phenomenon have chalked this up to the simple idea that when we are different, we just cannot get along. To most scholars, it would seem that when we are pitted against each other, we resort to violent means to prove that we are better than another group.

International relations are largely based on power-plays and the desire to not look weak, as per Kunz and Morgenthau (1948). No state desires to be the state that must act based on what another state tells it to do. Having strength and appearing strong are essential in international relations. Strength, which is intrinsically tied to power, is defined by Naím as “the capacity to get others to do, or stop doing, something” (2015). States have power; they get other people and other states to do want they want all the time. But states also do not have power when they become subjugated by another. States can garner power within their bounds by getting their people to rally behind their causes. Without the support of the people, a state could never really get far in its plans, so they try to create strong national pride. Creating national pride within a state is a great way of creating power; it ensures that there will be loyalty to a state and that power will not be stripped from it. However, it is important to recognize that it is impossible to create national pride and attraction to a state without creating a monster out of almost everything that is outside of the nationality.

Scholars have recognized that states and their identities are not always tied together. A state is simply a legal entity recognized internationally that governs over a land and a population (Davison, 2006/07). The population of a state does not have to fit under a single categorized nationality; and, in fact, a nationality can be spread over multiple states or contained within one. A nation is comprised of a group of people who share the same characteristics, such as race, history, language, and culture (Davison 2006/07). This is synonymous with ‘ethnicity’ in the broader sense that Varshney defines (2001). In cases where national identity is tied to the state, the standing of minority nationalities becomes very precarious.

This precarious standing becomes obvious when it is put into the context of national pride. Georgios Kavetsos writes “National Pride: War Minus the Shooting”, suggesting that national pride is something that people are willing to defend tooth and nail (2012). National pride becomes something that pits people against each other at every point. He describes that this pride comes from two different facets: an authentic pride and a hubristic pride (2012). Authentic pride is “pro-social aspect, associated with feelings of accomplishment, confidence, [and] success”, while hubristic pride is “anti-social aspect, linked to disagreeableness, neuroticism, [and] narcissism” (2012). Most often, it seems that states employ both kinds of pride to create national pride. Authentic pride is used positively to create almost a kinship between every member of the nation, and hubristic pride is used negatively to almost keep those who are not part of the nation away. National pride seems to raise up the nation at the expense of everyone outside it, thus playing off the role of power and strength that Kunz, Morgenthau, and Naím describe (1948; 2015).

Of course, it would seem obvious that different nations with conflicting characteristics would not mesh well together, especially when two nations share history with conflicting viewpoints and ideals. And when a state is being created for one nation in a geographic area that has two or more nationalities within it, ‘ultranationalist’, meaning ardently nationalistic, behavior becomes essential (Davison 2006/07). For example, when building a state, one would want to emphasize how “unique, special, and strong” membership into this community is and how essential it is to protect the state (Davison, 2006/07).

As Varshney implies, this creates ‘intraethnic’ pride, leading to polarization and hatred of those outside the group. This hatred and polarization is at its worst when the polarization is ‘intraethnic’ and ‘formal’, meaning that it is recognized by official entities within an ethnic group, such as the government (Varshney, 2001). Conversely, per Varshney, this hatred and polarization is at its lowest when there are interethnic, formal relations between two ethnicities (2001). However, it seems that oftentimes, interethnic relations—both formal and informal—lead to increasingly polarized formal, interethnic relations, which opposes Varshney’s thinking. This seems to happen because of the pernicious combination of authentic and hubristic pride that Kavetsos defines (2012). This opposition is proven when one looks at the example of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.

A recent example of polarization between two ethnic groups with formal relations can be found in that of Israel and Palestine. Once again, opposing Varshney’s view that interethnic, formal relations allow for more peace, these relations have allowed for the polarization of the groups. This polarization has been dubbed as ‘Israelization’ and ‘Palestinization’ (Dowty, 1998). Israelization is the creation of strong Israeli nationalism, while Palestinization is the creation of strong Palestinian nationalism. Dowty frames these manifestations of ultranationalism as positive, saying that they have helped the communities prosper. Essentially, the ultranationalist behavior was essential and still is essential for Israel’s continued existence and conversely the continued resistance to Israel’s authority within Palestine. Many scholars seem to suggest that the Israeli government has come to this conclusion as well (Saad, 2006; Nasser and Nasser, 2008). Yet, there are debates about how purposeful these trends of ‘Israelization’ and ‘Palestinization’ are, especially when considering Israel and Palestine’s interethnic relations.

The veracity of Dowty’s claims can be questioned when one considers Varshney’s theory that intraethnic relations provide for increased polarization. Ismael Abu-Saad, traces this polarization back to the time of the military government in Israel, which was in power during the nascent years of the state (2006). This relates to Kunz and Morgenthau’s theory that a state does not want to appear weak, which can be emphasized further if a state is in a geographical region surrounded by hostile neighbors (1948). Connecting to Davison’s and Varshney’s theories, this need for state strength led to ultranationalist behavior and ethnic conflict (2006/07; 2001).

Saad explains that the military government used the education system as a conduit to promote ultranationalist ideals. In the time of the military government, and continuing through to today, Jewish and Arab students were segregated. This forceful separation of Jews from Arabs, combined with an education system that valued Jews over Arabs, led to Jewish Israelis becoming even more nationalistic. These intraethnic relations became ultranationalist, which allowed Jewish Israelis to become even more resentful and polarized from Palestinians, as per Davison and Varshney (2006/07; 2001). Thus, interethnic relations deteriorated.

Some scholars say that within the Arab-Israeli community there has been more education since the war in 1967, which is ascribed to increased ‘Israelization’ (Dowty, 1998). However, the claim that ‘Israelization’, or intense Israeli nationalism, has led to increases in education seem highly unlikely given that the Israel, specifically its education system, paints Arabs in a highly negative light (Bitan, 1991; Pinson, 2008; Nasser and Nasser, 2008). It is obvious that the goal of education is to shape the way we think. When education is used to marginalize a group, it seems unlikely that membership within the marginalized group could ever be looked upon positively. Dowty suggests that Arab-Israelis are forgoing their own nationality for the nationality of the state in which they live; however, this just does not seem likely. He argues that ‘Israelization’ has overtaken ‘Palestinization’, but this seems very unlikely.

 Unless a marginalized group were to completely forgo their ethnicities for the preferred ethnicity, they likely could not ever be assimilated. This is supported by research conducted by Arar and Ibrahim which states that Arab-Israeli teachers are legally not allowed to promote Arab nationalism, and they feel frustrated by this (2016). Arab-Israeli teachers say that their students are having identity crises and negative self-perceptions because of the marginalization of their ethnicity in the education system. This points to how negative the perception of Arabs is in Israeli culture. Arar and Ibrahim report that to combat this, some Arab-Israeli schools have secretly set up programs to promote Arab nationalism. As Varshney would point out, these intraethnic relations are likely creating more polarization among the group (2001). Kavetsos would argue that this is promoting authentic pride, but authentic pride seems to come at the cost of hubristic pride (2012). It seems unlikely that these teachers are only promoting Arab nationalism. Likely, these programs are also promoting anti-Israeli sentiments. Whether that is intentional or not is nearly impossible to answer. Though these programs are supposed to help students feel comfortable and prideful of their identities, they likely have the unintended effect of promoting polarization.

The argument for ‘Israelization’ positively impacting Arab-Israelis is further undercut when one considers Arar and Ibrahim’s findings combined with the findings of Harel-Fisch et al. It is unclear and probably unlikely that the same schools were studied by both Arar and Ibrahim and Harel-Fisch et al, however, Harel-Fisch et al’s findings on their study of risk behaviors among Arab-Israeli youths is particularly disturbing, and points to a problem that effects Arab-Israeli children greatly. Their study looks at multiple risk behaviors and factors among youths, and it was found that Arab-Israelis have lower school grades, more injuries, more negative school experiences, and are bullied more than their Jewish peers (2012). If ‘Israelization’ was truly working for Arab-Israeli children, then it seems likely that these children would be no less likely to have these problems than Jewish children.

Harel-Fisch et al’s findings also point to the veracity of Kavetsos definition of hubristic pride. If ‘Israelization’ was working for these children, then it seems more likely that they would be experiencing authentic pride because they would like they were part of the group. But because of the negative image of Arabs in Israel, they can never feel like they are part of the Israeli nationality. Hubristic pride in Israelis combined with school programs that promote authentic pride in Arabs ensures that Arabs will never be able to find a comfortable place in Israel. It also teaches Israelis that they are better than Arabs, which leads to dire consequences.

These dire consequences, or really, the beginning of the end began in 2003. Max Blumenthal writes that at the end of the Second Intifada, a time when the hubristic pride of Israelis and Palestinians seemed to be at a high, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to pursue a policy of disengagement with Palestine, specifically the Gaza Strip (2015). A senior advisor to Sharon said that this disengagement policy effectively “‘removed [Gaza] indefinitely from our agenda’” (Blumenthal, 2015). There would be no discussion on Gaza, or refugees, or borders, or the ownership of Jerusalem. It would be ignored as if it was not even an existing issue. Blumenthal and Sharon’s government refer to this as “the freezing of the peace process” (2015). However, by ignoring the issue, the Israeli government seemed to start engaging in the worst kind of hubristic pride. Disengagement seems like a polite way of saying that they supposed that they would leave the problem to get worse until the Gazans were so beaten down that Israel could easily take control of the region once more.

Many scholars believe that following Israel’s disengagement with Gaza, Israel did not truly disengage with the territory; they argue that Israel was essentially still in charge. This argument is mostly borne out of the fact that Gaza is not a full-fledged state, and therefore it is still under Israel’s control. However, Hanne Cuyckens argues that Israel did completely disengage with Gaza. He argues that as an occupying power, Israel has the responsibility to ensure that the people it rules over are safe and provided humanitarian relief (2016). Following the official adoption of disengagement, Israel pulled all its troops out of Gaza and forced all Israeli settlers to leave the territory, leaving Gaza to figure things out for itself. By doing this, Israel may not have been giving Gaza statehood, but it gave the message that Gaza could do with itself as it wanted and Israel would not interfere. By following through with the disengagement policy, Israel was giving up its rights as an occupying power.

Blumenthal indicates that this disengagement led to Hamas’ rise to power in 2006 (2015). With “religious charity and armed struggle” Hamas won the election in Gaza (Blumenthal, 2015). Hamas’ victory was the result of Israel’s decision to remain hands-off in Gaza, allowing conditions to deteriorate and become a hotspot for “‘even bigger animals…[and] insane fundamentalist Islam’” (Blumenthal, 2015). Likely, these bad actors used a combination of authentic and hubristic pride to claim how wonderfully they would help Gazans as well as denounce the cruelties of the enemy—Israel. And so, an extremist terrorist organization came into power, and because of the disengagement policy, Israel did nothing to stop it.

In 2014, this decision proved how terrible it was. Interethnic relations reached a nadir when three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and killed by two Hamas members, sparking what multiple scholars have labeled as the most violent and contested period in Israel’s history—Operation Protective Edge (Blumenthal, 2014; Joronen, 2016). Joronen writes that Israel used questionable tactics during the fifty-day period that it engaged in the Operation, citing that a disproportionate number of the casualties were Palestinian civilians (2016). He explains that Israel claimed it was using ethical methods to wage war that “range from roof knocking to cautionary phone calls, text messages and air-dropped flyers” (2016). Yet he casts doubt on how ethical these tactics really were. He suggests that some of the tactics, particularly roof knocking, were not ethical because the civilian population was not viewed as passive in the conflict, rather that the “Gaza population is framed as active individuals responsible for their own fates and, indeed, deaths” (Joronen, 2016). Blumenthal adds to this commentary by explaining that on the Israeli territory, Operation Protective Edge was framed as an attempt to “transform Gaza from a bastion of armed resistance into a defanged Ramallah-on-the-sea” (2014). This caused intraethnic relations between the Israeli left and the Israeli right to deteriorate, as the left hated the war while the right supported it. By the conclusion of the war, when Israel emerged as the victor, Blumenthal claims that it was truly the Israeli right that won. Suddenly, a new wave of ultranationalism emerged.

Because of the precarious politics surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israelis and Palestinians are always faced with ultranationalist behavior. This behavior requires that citizens become ultranationalist. Israel and Palestine call upon this ultranationalist behavior to keep up their continued existences. However, this act is like a double-edged sword. While at times ultranationalism can be good, as Dowty suggests (2011), more often than not, this ultranationalist behavior, which manifests itself as Israelization or Palestinization, causes interethnic relations to deteriorate further. Those on one side cannot view those on the other side as equals. The other side becomes viewed as inferior, and when war comes about, it becomes more violent, as everyone on the opposite side is viewed as an enemy. People are not viewed as bystanders or active soldiers fighting for a cause; everyone is viewed as having an active role in the conflict. NGOs try to work to stop this from happening, and in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, NGOs that focus on human rights try to highlight the rights violations and make them public to try to stop interethnic relations from further deterioration.

Methods of Research

Ultranationalism is something that cannot be escaped. People cannot simply drop their identities, which makes it questionable if human rights NGOs can put aside their identities and look at human rights abuses objectively, especially when rights abuses are committed by their countrymen or countrymen’s enemies. To find out if this is at all possible, I analyzed B’Tselem and Al-Haq’s rhetoric from before and after Operation Protective Edge.

I used discourse analysis to analyze the rhetoric. I looked to see how each NGO describes the abuses and how this has changed over time. The first NGO is Al-Haq, a Palestinian NGO, while the second NGO, B’Tselem, is an Israeli NGO. This difference in national origin provided a perfect independent variable to study. It allowed me to study how difference in national origin potentially effects reporting. I thought that there would likely be variance in how these NGOs portray human rights abuses because of the identities of the people who make up those NGOs. This difference in reporting will partially account for my dependent variable. The rest of the dependent variable will come from how this reporting changed from before and after the summer of 2014.

I chose to study Al-Haq and B’Tselem very intentionally. Both are human rights NGOs that to work to help make sure that Israel and Palestine are acting in accordance with international human rights law. Both are large NGOs that are supported by a long list of creditable donors and supporters. These supporters and donors added to the creditability of these NGOs as being reputable sources of information. They allowed me to feel comfortable that I was not analyzing the rhetoric of simple bloggers. Studying the rhetoric of reputable NGO would point to useful data on how national identity affects reporting. Studying the rhetoric of two small NGOs or two bloggers would not point to anything significant. Also, arguably most importantly, both NGOs had reports and press releases that were already translated into English by staff at the NGOs. This was crucial as it helped to bypass the potential language barrier that could have been present when studying Israel and Palestine. Oftentimes, research is literally lost in translation as nuances in language do not always translate perfectly. While it is possible that some of the nuance behind the language is lost and that the research could have been nicely supplemented by reading the reports in the original Arabic and Hebrew as appropriate, I felt more comfortable studying the reports from these NGOs because the reports were translated by their staff. The websites and reports came with the option to read them in the original language of Arabic or Hebrew, or in English. They were not being translated by a secondary, outside translator. Essentially, Al-Haq and B’Tselem seemed like very similar NGOs that were only different because of their national origin.

Al-Haq is based out of Ramallah in the West Bank, and it says of itself that it “documents violations of the individual and collective rights of Palestinians in the OPT, irrespective of the identity of the perpetrator, and seeks to end such breaches by way of advocacy before national and international mechanisms and by holding the violators accountable” (n.d.). It works with actors locally, regionally, and internationally to advocate for proper enforcement of laws to protect innocent civilians caught up in the conflict. This NGO is supported by and affiliated with the International Commission of Jurists-Geneva, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Habitat International Coalition (HIC), and the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) (n.d.). Al-Haq has also been mentioned by B’Tselem, the other NGO being analyzed in this research project, in its reports and press releases.

B’Tselem is an NGO based out of Jerusalem. It is comprised of “prominent academics, attorneys, journalists, and Knesset members” that says of itself that it “acts primarily to change Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and ensure that its government, which rules the Occupied Territories, protects the human rights of residents there and complies with its obligations under international law” (n.d.). Because of the Knesset members on B’Tselem’s team, they can more easily bring human rights violations and the legal matters concerning them to the attention of the Israeli government. It is supported by and affiliated with Bread for the World, Consulat Général de France, Diakonia, European Commission, Firedoll, Fondation Pro Victimis, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Open Society Foundations, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Secretariat, New Israel Fund, Oxfam GB, Royal Norwegian Embassy, SIVMO, Stichting Niks Voor Niks, Trocaire, UNICEF, Zivik programme of the German Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, and others (2015). It has been mentioned by Al-Haq in some of their reports, as well.

To do this research, I read through each article and press release that Al-Haq and B’Tselem published about the killing of a civilian or civilians. I looked at reports of rights violations released by the NGOs regarding murder. I combed through the articles for examples of conservative, apologetic reporting or inflammatory finger-pointing, as appropriate. Rhetoric was likely to be spread throughout the document or report.

 I chose to analyze the language used to talk about murder because it seemed to be the type of human rights abuse that would be most easily traced. The murder of civilians by the military is easily considered a human rights abuse and would eliminate any ambiguity about the cases I chose to analyze. Also, the murder of civilians by military seemed to be the most likely type of abuse to garner a noticeable, or traceable reaction. People are upset by other human rights abuses such as torture or restriction of movement, but people and NGOs seem to be most upset and angered by an infringement on a person’s right to life. Also, it seemed more logical to focus just on one violation rather than many given the time constraints of this research project.

The period that I chose to analyze is also crucially important and provides the dependent variable of this research project. Operation Protective Edge has been described as having:

“…long-term ripple effects, however, [that] are still being felt, and are perhaps getting stronger: Israel’s international credit is depleted, sizeable chunks of public opinion have turned permanently hostile and the prospects of boycott loom larger than ever. With the benefit of hindsight, therefore, the Gaza war will likely be viewed in the future as a significant milestone on a dangerous diplomatic descent” (Shalev, n.d.)

It was an operation conducted over the summer of 2014 that seemed to have permanently changed the way the international community viewed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the way Palestinians and Israelis interacted with each other. It seems like a nadir in relations between Israel and Palestine caused by senseless violence that escalated into a catastrophic war to root out terrorists who the Israeli government claimed were in Gaza (BBC, 2014). It was a military operation that led to the death of over 1,000 Palestinian civilians by United Nations (UN) estimates, but only 66 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) deaths and 50 Hamas terrorist deaths (BBC, 2014). Since these numbers are so skewed, and the deaths of these civilians could have been easily prevented, Operation Protective Edge led to a further deterioration of relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. This deterioration provides a clearer view into how human rights NGOs such as Al-Haq and B’Tselem reacted to the events, as well as a look into their ability to potentially shirk off ultranationalist behavior, or not.

Operation Protective Edge was launched just over three years ago on July 8, 2014, ending on August 26, 2014. To get a sufficient representation of the rhetoric from before the operation, I started looking at reports from January 2012 and later. I did not look at reports from before January 2012 for multiple reasons. First, it would have been logistically impossible to read and account for all the reports given the time constraints of this research project. Second, it seemed somewhat illogical to study ten to fifteen years of rhetoric from the NGOs before the event given that barely three years have passed since the event. Third, there were other military operations in 2008, 2009, and 2012, but none of them seemed to produce the same sort of shockwaves that Operation Protective Edge did. Therefore, it seemed most logical to study the rhetoric in three stages: before Operation Protective Edge, during Operation Protective Edge, and after Operation Protective Edge.

I expected NGOs positions and rhetoric to vary greatly because of their identities. Every person is shaped by their experiences, so an Israeli would likely have very different experiences than a Palestinian. The ultranationalism that is present in Israelis and Palestinians likely affects those working within the NGOs. Because of this, Israelis and Palestinians are likely to view military conflict in Palestinian territory differently. Even when Israelis and Palestinians are involved in the same work (human rights NGOs), their life experiences will influence how they view different violations pertaining to military conflict. B’Tselem’s rhetoric will likely be slightly less condemning since it is an Israel-based NGO, while the rhetoric of Al-Haq will likely be more blaming since it is a Palestine-based NGO. Essentially, it is quite probable that there would be huge variation in how each NGO identifies and reports violations because of the identities of those in the NGO.

Below, I will discuss specifically how B’Tselem and Al-Haq reacted to the operation. But to understand their reactions to Operation Protective Edge, it is important to judge them according to how they reacted to other murders of civilians by military. For that reason, I will first analyze the rhetoric of Al-Haq and B’Tselem before Operation Protective Edge. Following that, I will analyze their rhetoric during the operation. I will conclude by analyzing their rhetoric from after the event.

To analyze this rhetoric, I will at three measures: blaming, naming, and imagery. When I look at blaming, I looked to see who is blamed for human rights violations. Does the NGO place all the blame on one actor, or is the blame for the violation given to multiple actors? In other words: does the NGO say that the fault of the violation lays solely with the perpetrator, or is the victim implicated for causing the violation, as well? The second measure, naming, somewhat coincides with the first one. By what names do the NGOs refer to the actors? For example, Al-Haq seems to start calling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the Israeli Occupying Forces (IOF) in more recent reports. How do they refer to Palestinians? How does B’Tselem refer to the IDF? And how does B’Tselem refer to Palestinians, civilian or otherwise? Finally, to look at imagery, I will look to see how vividly the NGO describes the human rights violation. I analyzed if these ways of describing violations have become more polarized since Operation Protective Edge.

It is also important to recognize that many of these analyses are comparisons of each other. There is no statistical analysis to describe the reporting; it is all relative to the other analyses. It must be understood in reference to all reports looked at. For example, it must be understood that when the language of reports from before Operation Protective Edge is being analyzed, it is being analyzed in comparison to the language of reports from after Operation Protective Edge.

Empirical Section

Following the murder of the yeshiva boys and the Palestinian boy, the IDF launched Operation Protective Edge. At the end of Operation Protective Edge, it seems to have only been cast in a negative light almost unanimously by everyone except the IDF and the Israeli government. Israeli and Palestinian relations do not seem to have improved, and, indeed, it seems as if people, specifically the NGOs involved are only getting increasingly frustrated.

Because of this, it will be important to pay attention to a few things in the analysis of the rhetoric. For Al-Haq, it is intrinsically important to note the names that it uses to describe the IDF before and after the conflict, as well as the language used in the description of the death. Al-Haq seems to use more visceral language after Operation Protective Edge. For B’Tselem it is important to note how different its reporting is from Al-Haq’s and to recognize the nuances in the language. B’Tselem does not often use visceral language, and when it does, it is not as intense as the language used by Al-Haq. Al-Haq is much more likely to describe the bloodiness and wrongfulness of the violation, whereas B’Tselem is much less likely to vividly describe what happened.

We should ask if rhetoric is pro-Palestinian at the expense of being very anti-Semitic or anti-Israel when looking at Al-Haq. We should also ask if rhetoric is pro-Israeli at the expense of being very Islamophobic or anti-Arab when looking at B’Tselem. It seems likely that the NGOs are somewhat biased towards the nationality that they identify with.

A.    Al-Haq before Operation Protective Edge (January 2012 to July 7, 2014)

A typical report from Al-Haq before Operation Protective Edge reads similarly to their report, “Rashad Shawakha killed by Israeli agents in disguise”. In a village near Ramallah, around 2:00 AM on March 27, 2012, three brothers noticed “two men loitering near their houses” and “were afraid that they were thieves who wanted to steal their cars or sheep” (Al-Haq, 2012). Al-Haq writes that two of the brothers “left their houses first carrying a knife and a baton for self-defence” and approached the unidentified men before the third followed (2012). According to Al-Haq’s report:

“A quarrel took place and Akram asked about the purpose of their presence and for their ID cards, to which one of the men answered, that they work in Rammoun and that he had personally bought land in the village. Given that these two men turned out to be Israeli agents in disguise, this clearly amounts to perfidy, which includes the feigning of civilian status, and amounts to a war crime under international humanitarian law” (2012).

The brothers reported that this confrontation led to the Israeli soldiers shooting them, and Al-Haq reports that one brother was “lying in pain on the ground” while other Israeli soldiers surrounded the area. Al-Haq writes that after this brother noticed all the soldiers in the area

“He told them that he was wounded and tried to reach for the lights of his garage but one of the soldiers shot him again in his abdomen and kicked him in the head. Akram then saw soldiers surrounding his brother Rashad and shooting him several times. It was later determined that Rashad had been shot seven times in his abdomen, hand and thigh” (2012).

Al-Haq reports that one brother died and that the IDF said it would investigate the incident. They do not have any update that indicates what happened in the IDF’s investigation.

It is important to note how Al-Haq tries to play off empathetic appeals. Everyone can understand the fear the brothers must have experienced when thinking that thieves may have come to their houses. Saying this also gives the brothers a credible reason for carrying weapons—they were acting in self-defense, as Al-Haq notes. Another empathetic appeal that Al-Haq plays off is when they describe how one brother was “lying in pain on the ground” (2012). This phrase lends to the imagery that Al-Haq wants to portray the victims in. Al-Haq paints the Palestinians in a light that makes them out to be completely innocent—rightfully or not. They do not interview the IDF to try to find out every side of the story; they simply rely on the reporting of the victims. This allows them to put all the blame on the soldiers—rightfully or wrongfully. They also point out that international law was broken when the soldiers did not identify themselves as soldiers. However, interestingly, they do not specifically state which international law was broken. Also, they call the IDF soldiers “Israeli soldiers” (2012). Naming the IDF as “Israeli soldiers” is very important.

Oftentimes, to garner an emotional appeal, Al-Haq uses imagery. They describe the horrors done unto the victim or the suffering that those closest to the victim go through. There are many examples in the article described above, “Rashad Shawakha killed by Israeli agents in disguise”, but it is almost impossible to find reports written by Al-Haq that do not use this same type of language. Another article entitled “12 Palestinians killed in One Week in the Gaza Strip” describes how “the firing of a rocket by an Israeli aircraft resulted in the death of the 13-year-old boy...His blind father…suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure was completely dependent on him” (2012). The only purpose of the description of the victim’s father is to reinforce the image that this 13-year-old boy was indeed an innocent victim who was a benevolent caregiver. It also allows Al-Haq to suggest that there is a second victim of the attack in the boy’s father.

            An interesting comparison to make is the difference between the way Al-Haq talks about the IDF killing a Palestinian versus the way they talk about Hamas killing a Palestinian. For example, in a 2012 article entitled “Capital punishment in Gaza: A continuing and alarming practice”, Al-Haq discusses how Hamas has illegally sentenced thirty-eight people to death since 2007 and sixteen of those people have since been illegally executed (Al-Haq, 2012). In contrast with what Al-Haq normally talks about, it does not cite any international laws broken, it only talks about the Palestinian laws broken. Intriguingly, Al-Haq does not use the same sort of emotional appeal that it normally uses when it talks about the death of a Palestinian by the IDF. They say that “The conservative and honour-based value system that permeates Gazan society prevents Al-Haq field researchers from documenting many of these cases…due to the perceived dishonour brought by the crimes in question” (2012). Yet, in cases where Palestinians were breaking laws and were subsequently punished, Al-Haq can get interviews. An example of this can be found in 2012 report “Palestinian killed by Israeli Soldiers at al-Za’yyam Checkpoint” in which a Palestinian man was killed when trying to illegally cross the border to work. Al-Haq does admit that he broke the law, but that he and other men like him are the “main supporters of their families, cannot find jobs in the West bank and have no other choice but to work illegally in Israel” (2012). This either speaks to Palestinians’ willingness to talk about the harm they have done unto soldiers, or Al-Haq’s unwillingness to understand incidents fully.

            In 2013, Al-Haq wrote an article entitled “Death of Israeli Soldier Triggers Raids on Palestinian Homes”. In it, they describe that “Israeli forces announced that an Israeli soldier had been shot dead…in the southern part of Hebron. In retaliation, hundreds of Israeli soldiers were deployed in the neighbourhoods of Qaytun, Abu Sneineh and Jabal Johar” (Al-Haq, 2013). It is interesting that they say that the IDF announced the death, instead of just saying that a soldier died, suggesting that Al-Haq is questioning the veracity of the IDF’s claim. They also describe the deployment of troops into Palestine as being “in retaliation” (Al-Haq, 2013). This description suggests that Al-Haq finds the move unwarranted and rash. The language suggests the IDF is making callous moves to disrupt the lives of Palestinians instead of simply saying that a soldier was killed and the IDF deployed troops in response.

            A final interesting analysis of Al-Haq’s rhetoric can be found in its reporting of the 2014 report it has entitled “Evidence of Wilful Killing at Al-Nakba Day Protest”. This report is interesting particularly because B’Tselem has a report on the incident as well that will be discussed in Part B. Al-Haq writes that “soldiers were about 50 metres away from the protestors, some of whom were throwing stones in their direction…the soldiers were located on higher ground, the stones could not reach them. The soldiers were indiscriminately firing tear gas and rubber bullets at the protestors” (2014). Al-Haq writes of one the victims that he “heard live bullets being fired and then felt a searing pain in his chest and was thrusted backwards” (2014). According to Al-Haq, multiple witnesses describe a “young boy carrying a schoolbag, dressed in black with his face covered by a keffiyeh fall to the ground” after being shot (2014). All witnesses report that they later learned that “died as a result of his injury” (2014).

            It is interesting that even though Al-Haq notes that the IDF did open an investigation on the incident, they do not include any testimony from the soldiers, which allows them to put all blame on the soldiers. The IDF is referred to as “Israeli forces” or “Israeli soldiers”. The imagery used to describe the pain the boy felt after being shot allows the reader to feel empathy for him.

Before Operation Protective Edge, Al-Haq did not humanize their victims a lot, comparatively to the way it does so after the military operation. They often refer to the IDF as the “Israeli army”, “Israeli military”, or “Israeli soldiers” (2013; 2012; 2012). Their reports on killings are easy to find because they always state within the title that someone died or was killed. And by only interviewing the victims and including somewhat superfluous details about the incident or their lives, Al-Haq can cast all blame on the IDF—rightfully or not.

B.    B’Tselem before Operation Protective Edge (January 2012 to July 7, 2014)

A typical report from B’Tselem from before Operation Protective Edge reads like their report from 2012, “Investigate death, injuries from live firing during Land Day demonstrations in Gaza”. They write that on March 30, 2012,

“During a demonstration…some 300 youths came within a few dozen meters of the wall and fortifications surrounding the crossing and threw stones at them. Although the demonstrators were unarmed, the army responded with live firing at the protesters and stone-throwers. One demonstrator…was killed. Several dozen youths were shot in the arms or legs and sustained light wounds. It appears that soldiers used live ammunition despite having tear gas at their disposal, which they also used” (B’Tselem, 2012).

In response to this event, B’Tselem wrote to the Military Police and the Military Advocate General Corps saying that

“B’Tselem’s letter noted that the events raise a grave suspicion of illegal and unjustified use of live ammunition when soldiers were in no danger whatsoever. Land Day demonstrations were announced in advance and the army should have been prepared for demonstrations and clashes along Gaza’s border with Israel, in a way that would have enabled soldiers to use only non-lethal crowd control measures” (2012).

It is important to note the relatively measured approach that B’Tselem uses to talk about the violation. Unlike Al-Haq, they do not use the imagery of what specifically happened during an incident. They write that “One demonstrator,: Mahmoud Muhammad Yihya Zaqut, age 19, of Beit Lahiya, was killed” without saying specifically what happened (2014). One could argue that this could point to B’Tselem’s attempt to hide what happened at the event, however, this seems unlikely given that they “demanded that a Military Police investigation be launched immediately to examine suspected misconduct” (2014). This statement also points to B’Tselem’s keenness to truly understand what happened and have the appropriate discipline doled out to the offending IDF soldiers. This means that they were fully willing to blame the IDF for what happened, but unlike Al-Haq they do it after having spoken to the IDF about the incident.

In Part A, I analyzed Al-Haq’s report on the Al-Nakba Day killings. Here I will analyze B’Tselem’s report on the same issue, entitled “B'Tselem's initial findings on Nakba Day incident at Bitunya: grave suspicion that forces willfully killed two Palestinians, injured two others” (2014). In the report, B’Tselem writes that “four Palestinians were shot with live ammunition…during a demonstration marking Nakba Day” (2014). After interviewing the IDF, B’Tselem writes “IDF Spokesperson stated that army forces operating in the area that day had used only crowd control means, and not live ammunition. B'Tselem's investigation refuted this version, finding strong evidence that live ammunition was used and that the fire hit the upper torsos of all four victims…These findings raise grave suspicion that the killing was willful” (2014). They go into further evidence that refutes the IDF’s claim and finish by saying that they are “demanding an investigation…into the soldiers' conduct in the incident…the responsibility of senior officers who were present at the scene for the killing of civilians by lethal force…[and] the military's highly incorrect version of the incident conveyed to the media” (2014).

            What is interesting about this report is the stark contrast in the way B’Tselem reports the incident from the way Al-Haq reports it. B’Tselem does put all the blame onto the IDF for the killings, but they do so after interviewing the IDF. They do not use the same vivid imagery that Al-Haq employs, not relying on empathetic appeal to talk about the rights violation. They simply state that the IDF violated human rights by illegally shooting protestors with live ammunition. To refer to the IDF members involved, they use more proper titles such as “senior officers”, “Military Police Investigations” and “Border Police officer” (2014). More usage of proper titles suggests respect for the IDF as an organization, which would make sense given that Israelis likely have respect for the army. They likely have respect for the army because it is a constant presence in the lives of most Israelis—they all know that they will have to serve for two or three years once they graduate high school.

            Arguably, some of the most important articles that B’Tselem wrote are the reports from when the three yeshiva boys and the Palestinian boy were killed. These are the three yeshiva boys that were kidnapped and killed by Hamas members, and the Palestinian was the boy who was burned to death in revenge by Israelis. The killing of the yeshiva boys sparked Operation Protective Edge. The articles are: “The government must refrain from acts of vengeance and security forces must prepare for possible acts of revenge by settlers” which was released on June 30, 2014; “B'Tselem strongly condemns the abduction and killing of the three Yeshiva students” which was released on June 30, 2014; and “B’Tselem strongly condemns the abduction and killing of Muhammad Abu Khdeir” which was released on July 6, 2014.

            Perhaps the most surprising aspect of these three reports is their brevity. Each report is only a short paragraph. It is also interesting that B’Tselem released the first article listed before the one that discussed the killing of the yeshiva boys. It raises the question of where B’Tselem’s interests lay more: in keeping the peace or in condemning murder. In the first article, it says: “…B'Tselem cautions the security forces to avoid harming the innocent Palestinian population, or abusing the public atmosphere in Israel with the discovery of the bodies, to impose collective punishment…The deliberate harming of an entire civilian population as punishment for the actions of individuals is both illegal and immoral” (B’Tselem, 2014).

The second article reads: “B'Tselem strongly condemns the abduction and killing of the three Yeshiva students…and offers its condolences to the families. Deliberate targeting of civilians undermines all moral, legal and human principles…[and] is defined as a grave breach of international humanitarian law, and cannot be justified, regardless of the circumstances” (B’Tselem, 2014). The third article reads:

“B’Tselem strongly condemns the abduction and killing of Muhammad Abu Khdeir…who was burned alive by his captors…[and expresses] its sincerest condolences to Abu Khdeir’s family. This act of violence undermines all moral, legal and human norms. The intentional killing of civilians is categorically prohibited under international humanitarian law, which defines it as a grave breach, and states that such an action has no justification, regardless of the circumstances. In view of the present situation, it is essential that the investigation of this case be transparent and include swift and complete disclosure of its findings, first to Abu Khdeir’s family and immediately thereafter to the public” (B’Tselem, 2014).

The most interesting aspect to analyze is the similarities and differences between the last two articles. B’Tselem writes that murder “undermines all moral, legal and human principles” and that it is a “grave breach” of international law (2014). By using this same language, B’Tselem puts the boys on equal standing and does not hold up the murder of one as more heinous than the other. By doing this, B’Tselem seems to shirk off the seemingly ironclad grip of ultranationalism and hubristic pride. In the articles, they also do not place blame on any specific actor. Only the acts of abduction and murder are mentioned when talking about the yeshiva boys; “abductors” or “murderers” are not mentioned. In the article about the Palestinian boy, the Israelis that murdered him are only referred to as “his captors” (2014). By not using the words “killers” or “murderers”, B’Tselem keeps tension from rising higher. If those words had been used, then the articles would have become much more flagrant. The idea of a “captor” has a much less frightening and angering connotation to it than the idea of a “murderer” does.

Before Operation Protective Edge, B’Tselem does not get into the specifics of an incident in the same way that Al-Haq does. Where Al-Haq is likely to use imagery to create empathy, B’Tselem simply says that a person was killed by some actor. While B’Tselem does place blame fully onto the IDF for most of the incidents, it does so after investigating the incident from both sides. It also names members of the IDF using their proper titles, such as the Military Advocate General Corps.

C.    Al-Haq during Operation Protective Edge (July 8, 2014 to August 26, 2014)

During Operation Protective Edge, Al-Haq posts one very long article that it continually updated throughout the operation. Entitled “Al-Haq Field Updates from the Gaza Strip”, it was updated periodically from July 10, 2014 through August 26, 2014. Al-Haq writes “Since 8 July and the commencement of 'Operation Protective Edge', Israeli hostilities have continued against the occupied Gaza Strip with a growing number of civilian deaths, injuries and property destruction” (2014). There is no mention of why the operation was started, and the article itself is not very descriptive; any death recorded in it is simple listed out in bulleted form.

Perhaps one of the most telling reports from this time is “Nineteen year old Palestinian Killed Due to Excessive Use of Force by Israeli Soldiers”, released on July 25, 2014. This article is so important because Al-Haq ceases to call the IDF b any moniker it previously used. They write: “On Monday 14 July, Munir Ahmad al-Badarin, 19, was shot and killed by Israeli Occupying Forces (IOF) while on his way to throw stones at Israeli vehicles…” (2014). Arabs and Palestinians call the IDF the IOF to paint the IDF as an invader and a malicious force. By calling them the IOF, Al-Haq officially adopts the narrative that the Israeli military is not something Israel uses for defense, rather, it something used for more offensive purposes.

This usage of “Israeli Occupying Forces” marks a turning point in the reporting of Al-Haq. By using the term “IOF”, Al-Haq essentially says that any human rights incident that takes place in the future will be the fault of the Israelis because they invaded and occupied a land that was not theirs. It also suggests that the reporting will become more reactionary and that victims will further be portrayed as completely innocent—rightfully or not.

D.    B’Tselem during Operation Protective Edge (July 8, 2014 to August 26, 2014)

During Operation Protective Edge, B’Tselem starts to become more visible angered by the incidents. In one article released on July 21, 2014 entitled “B’Tselem calls on the Government of Israel to immediately cease the bombardment of inhabited homes, neighborhoods and areas in the Gaza Strip”, B’Tselem starts to use more descriptive language to describe the incidents. They write “The horrific developments in Gaza have reached intolerable heights: Israel is bombing houses with people in them, entire families have been buried under rubble, and streets lie in ruins” (2014). While this type of imagery is not as intense as the imagery used by Al-Haq previously, it is still more intense than what B’Tselem normally writes.

However, in a move quite contrary to what Al-Haq does, B’Tselem places blame onto both the IDF and Hamas. They write that “Israel considers any perceived link to Hamas justification for attack. Hamas considers any place in Israel a target. One party fires at civilians…The other party fires at densely populated civilian areas, with deadly results on a shocking scale” and that “Hamas makes no pretense to follow the laws of war. Israel does, but holds Hamas responsible for its own actions – the dead, the refugees, the destroyed homes… unlawful actions by one party cannot justify unlawful actions by the other, and regardless, each party bears sole responsibility for the outcome of its actions” (B’Tselem, 2014). By writing that each party is responsible, B’Tselem recognizes that this is not a problem in which one party can be dealt all the blame. They acknowledge that wrongs have been committed on both sides, and do not simply blame “Palestinians” or “Israeli soldiers” for the problem. They are specific in who is at fault, and do not make it the sole responsibility of one group or another.

E.    Al-Haq after Operation Protective Edge (August 27, 2014 to July 2017)

Following Operation Protective Edge, Al-Haq almost exclusively refers to the IDF as the IOF. Occasionally, they will refer to the IDF as “Israeli soldiers”, similarly to the way they referred to them before Operation Protective Edge. Yet following 2016, Al-Haq exclusively refers to the IDF as the IOF. It is unclear what caused this permanent change. Perhaps as more information came out regarding human rights abuses during Operation Protective Edge, Al-Haq’s tolerance for calling the IDF by proper titles diminished.

A typical report from this time is the report “Israel's Blatant Disregard of Palestinian Civilians' Lives”, published April 19, 2015. They write that people were throwing stones at soldiers, and that “At that point, the soldiers opened fire heavily and indiscriminately towards the funeral procession. The participants dispersed fearing for their lives” (Al-Haq, 2015). One man was seen “bending down trying to protect himself from the bullets. Ziyad then fell on his face, convulsed, and stopped moving” (Al-Haq, 2015). At the end of the article, Al-Haq writes that

“The right to life is guaranteed under international human rights law, including Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, under international standards, including the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the use of firearms should be limited and exceptional, and guided by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Ziyad was lethally shot, even though he did not pose a serious threat to the soldiers by throwing stones” (Al-Haq, 2015).

In the article, the IDF is referred to as the “Israeli Occupying Forces” (Al-Haq, 2015). The blame for the violation is placed onto the IDF, which is evident both in the quote where international law is referenced and in the use of “Israeli Occupying Forces”. By stating that international human rights law guarantees life as a right, Al-Haq turns the situation starkly black-and-white. However, by stating that Ziyad did not pose a “serious threat”, they are stating that he did pose some threat, even if it was minimal. But they state that regardless of what happened, the IDF had no right to kill the man.

Al-Haq also employs strong imagery in their report. By stating that people were fearing for their lives and that a man was trying to protect himself from bullets before being shot, Al-Haq plays on the fear that everyone has of being caught in a firefight, especially when they are defenseless. This imagery diminishes the image of these men throwing stones at IDF soldiers, replacing it with ideas of innocent men trying to save themselves from death.

It is interesting to compare the way that Al-Haq reports on Israeli violations to the way in which Palestinian violations are reported following August 2014. For example, in “Palestinian Executed in Gaza”, a report published by Al-Haq on February 23, 2016, the reporting style is noticeably different. The article discusses a member of the Al-Qassam Brigades who was eventually executed, writing that “During his detention, Mahmoud's family learned that he was continuously subjected to torture during interrogations. At one point, Mahmoud was able to send his family a letter which described his continuous torture by the Al-Qassam leaders and said that he was pressured to confess to accusations that he did not commit” (Al-Haq,2016). Later, he was “killed after being shot with a bullet that hit the left side of his chest. The family believes that Mahmoud was detained, interrogated and killed due to internal disputes between him and members of the Al-Qassam Brigades” (Al-Haq, 2016). The article ends by writing that “Al-Haq is deeply troubled by Mahmoud’s execution which may amount to an arbitrary deprivation of life and may be considered an extra-judicial killing” (Al-Haq, 2016).

It is interesting that Al-Haq does not condemn the Al-Qassam Brigades in the same way it condemns the IDF. The Al-Qassam Brigades is the military arm of Hamas, the ruling party of Gaza that is considered by many to be a flagrant violator of human rights. Hamas is a radical party that refused to co-run the government in Gaza with Fatah, following the elections in 2006. Al-Haq has written articles before on the violations committed by Hamas and the Al-Qassam Brigades, but they have never started calling them by different names like they do with the IDF.

It is also important to note that Al-Haq writes that it is “deeply troubled” by the actions taken by Hamas, but that it “condemns” actions taken by the IDF. The phrase “deeply troubled” suggests a more passive reaction, whereas “condemns” suggests true abhorrence. This more passive language is also reflected in the lack of imagery found within the report. Unlike its reports on IDF violations, Al-Haq does not describe the actions taken against the Palestinian.

Overall, since Operation Protective Edge, the reports by Al-Haq are descriptive and very quick to blame the IDF for violations—rightfully or not. The term “IOF” suggests a low tolerance to understand the violation from all angles, making it seems as though Al-Haq will always believe that the Israelis were in the wrong. “Israeli Occupying Forces” gives a connotation that suggests that the IDF takes wrongfully and is not a group out to protect itself, but rather that it is a group out to ruin the lives of innocents.

F.    B’Tselem after Operation Protective Edge (August 27, 2017 to July 2017)

After July 2014, B’Tselem goes through marked changes, just like Al-Haq. But unlike Al-Haq, B’Tselem does not react as viscerally to violations, still maintaining more equanimity in their reports. However, with this equanimity, B’Tselem also takes on a demeanor of being unsurprised and almost prescient about the human rights violations. For example, in a report entitled “B'Tselem: A burned infant was only a matter of time in view of policy to not enforce law on violent settlers”, released on July 31, 2015, B’Tselem gives the reader the impression that they suspected that something like this would happen. They write:

“The killing of a one and a half year old infant, 'Ali Sa'ed Dawabsheh, and the serious injury of his mother Riham, his father Sa'ed and his toddler brother 'Ahmed, after a suspected arson attack by Israeli civilians burned their home, was only a matter of time. This, due to the authorities' policy to avoid enforcing the law on Israelis who harm Palestinians and their property. This policy creates impunity for hate crimes, and encourages assailants to continue, leading to this morning's horrific result” (B’Tselem, 2015).

They conclude the article by writing:

“The fact that…law enforcement bodies have failed to solve these attacks isn't fate. Rather, it is the result of a policy expressed throughout all levels of the law enforcement system, in particular the political echelons, up to and including the Prime Minister. In light of this, official condemnations of this attack are empty rhetoric…the clock is ticking in the countdown to the next arson attack, and the one after” (B’Tselem, 2015).

In an update to the article, B’Tselem writes that both parents that were attacked “succumbed to his [or her] injuries” (2015). These statements show a stark change in the way that B’Tselem reports and shows that they are officially recognizing that the impunity by which these violations occur stems from a whole law enforcement and political system that does not value Palestinian lives. They are probably the closest that B’Tselem will ever actually come to saying that their countrymen are the root of the problem and put all the blame on Israelis.

            The imagery used in the report is not nearly as visceral as the content that Al-Haq puts out, but it serves a similar purpose and seems to make the situation seem more ominous. By using the metaphor of a clock ticking towards the next arson attack—or really, the next family being burned alive—B’Tselem instills anxiety in the reader. This anxiety is supposed to serve as a rallying call; it is supposed to make the reader bandwagon behind B’Tselem’s desire to stop this from happening again or to be part of the enlightened side that sees the true issue.

            A final noteworthy report is from June 22, 2016, entitled “Shooting at the car carrying Mahmoud Badran was deliberate, entirely unjustified and a direct result of military policy”. This report is noteworthy because it is the first time that B’Tselem includes direct testimony from the Palestinian victims. B’Tselem writes that

“soldiers shot and killed Mahmoud Badran…and wounded four of his friends…who were making their way back from a night out at a water park. The military initially announced the soldiers had ‘targeted terrorists who were throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli cars on Road 443’, but later changed its version and stated the boy had been ‘mistakenly’ killed, and that the MPIU was investigating the incident. Research…indicates that the soldiers used heavy fire against the moving car without any justification” (2016).

B’Tselem writes that even though the military said it would investigate, “military law enforcement system mainly serves as a whitewashing mechanism, which means there is scant hope that this investigation would lead to systemic change in military policy or bring justice” (2016). This reveals B’Tselem growing lack of trust in the military law enforcement system. But for however disenchanted they have become, B’Tselem still refers to the military by its proper names, unlike Al-Haq and its use of “IOF”.

Following Operation Protective Edge, B’Tselem becomes more inflamed and visibly angry in its reporting. This anger is not as pronounced as Al-Haq’s anger, but the language used still suggests more emotion towards the violations than what was expressed before July 2014. B’Tselem still has a more measured approach to reporting, but they are unsurprised by violations and exasperated that they occur. They have grown tired of the law enforcement and government giving passes to the injustices committed, easily blaming the IDF and other Israeli actors for the hatred against Palestinians that has caused violence. Yet though they harbor this distrust of law enforcement and the government, B’Tselem does not refrain from calling everything by their proper titles nor does it resort to calling them derogatory names.

Conclusion: An Escalation of Frustrations

Operation Protective Edge led to the death of any possible reconciliation between Palestine and Israel. In a chapter entitled “Good Night, Left Side” Max Blumenthal writes that “The invasion of Gaza serves as a bonanza for right-wing political mobilization, catalyzing an ultra-nationalist march through the institutions of the Jewish state” that in the words of Baruch Kimmerling turned Israel into “‘a Thatcherist and semi-fascist regime” against the Palestinian people’” (2015). He says “As Israeli Minister of Internal Security Yitzhak Aharonovitz issued a ban on all public demonstrations against the war—‘There is no left and right here—we need to unite as a country and support the IDF soldiers who are fighting,’ he declared—the pro-war nationalists centered in on the media” (2015). Even though people were told to drop their political identities in the face of the war, the right still gained the upper hand, allowing ultranationalism to become the guiding force.

By looking at Al-Haq and B’Tselem over this time span of five years from before to after Operation Protective Edge, we can see this ultranationalism taking over by looking at some marked changes in the style of reporting. Perhaps the most significant change for Al-Haq was when they started calling the Israel Defense Forces the Israeli Occupying Forces, which allowed them to engage in hubristic pride. Kavetsos writes of hubristic pride that it is “anti-social aspect, linked to disagreeableness, neuroticism, [and] narcissism” (2012). When they began calling the IDF the IOF, Al-Haq essentially cut off any sort of understanding that could occur between the group; the usage of “IOF” made Al-Haq anti-social towards any prospect of mutual understanding and peace. B’Tselem’s biggest change is that its language became more descriptive throughout the period. While it did not describe the way victims were in pain, it did become more descriptive as it gave more indication of what happened during an event. However, it was always careful to include every side of the story—not ignoring what Palestinians said or what the IDF reported.

It is interesting that most of the reports that Al-Haq and B’Tselem write do not refer to the same incidents. The only incidents that they both reported on were the Al-Nakba Day killings in 2014 and various incidents from during Operation Protective Edge. There is no logical reason why they would not report mostly the same violations, unless there are many gaps in what is reported to each NGO. Perhaps, this happens because there is little communication between the NGOs. Maybe they only communicate when there is a particularly noteworthy violation. This could point to another rift caused by the ultranationalism and national pride that is so intrinsically part of people that they cannot separate their personal feelings from their professional jobs completely.

This ultranationalism is often evident in reports and may point to how each NGO views itself in relation to other actors. When Al-Haq reports on a killing, they write that they “condemn” the actions taken by the military (2013). When B’Tselem reports on a killing, they write that they “demanded” an investigation into the incident by military police (2012). This simple and slight change in language is rather odd when one considers the language and style the NGOs traditionally write in. One would expect Al-Haq to “demand” an investigation, given the intense imagery they have been known to use and the quickness to which they assign blame and innocence in an incident. One would expect B’Tselem to “condemn” the actions of the military given the more calm and measured approach that they take towards reporting.

However, it makes sense why Al-Haq “condemns” while B’Tselem “demands” when one considers the broader dynamics of ultranationalism and pride. Because of the hubristic pride that exists within Israelis, specifically the IDF, against Palestinians, it seems unlikely that the Israelis would take the Palestinians’ demand seriously. Israelis do not look kindly upon Palestinians because of the ultranationalist agenda that must be present within the state to bandwagon everyone into the cause of Israeli national defense. Because B’Tselem is comprised of Israelis who can be looked upon as equals by other Israelis, they can indulge in authentic pride. Israelis are more likely to listen to Israelis telling them to investigate, rather than what they consider to be animals. It is evident that Palestinians are considered animals in Israeli culture when one looks at the plethora of statements by Israeli officials that effectively say so. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indeed said of the three yeshiva boys that started Operation Protective Edge that they were “abducted and murdered by human animals” (Blumenthal, 2015). Because of this, it can be concluded that Israelis have clout with other Israelis; Palestinians are much less likely to have clout with Israelis.

These issues of ultranationalism and national pride can be traced back to education. Israeli education systems teach children from a young age that they are better than Arabs and Palestinians. By doing this, Israelis engage in authentic and hubristic pride, which is dangerous. It affects the Israel-Palestine conflict. The conflict comes down to more than just territory; it comes down to identity. If Israeli children are raised to believe that they are better than Palestinians, then they will be looking at the conflict in the same mentality as those who started it. If the conflict is ever going to be solved, then Israelis needs to start looking at Arabs and Palestinians as equals. Identity can be expressed through our words, and if NGOs focused on human rights cannot separate themselves from the identities they grew up with, then how could anyone else? My research could show that the identities Palestinians and Israelis are ingrained with are problematic towards creating peace, so maybe making education policy that is more driven towards accepting different groups would make people more amenable to seeing eye-to-eye.

            Because of how damaging Operation Protective Edge was towards any prospect of meaningful communication between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it seems unlikely that the conflict will improve, unless attitudes change. Attitudes and beliefs are deeply ingrained in us, especially nationalistic beliefs in times of war. Unity in a nation and love of a nation are pertinent to creating a strong force, so ultranationalistic belief becomes commonplace in society. This causes hate to form through hubristic pride, and oftentimes, this leads to violent attacks perpetrated against those who are deemed enemies of the nation. NGOs are created to try to bring attention to these violations, but it is nearly impossible for them to quell their personal attitudes towards the violations. The people working in these NGOs were raised in the same ultranationalistic environments as everyone else in the states and were therefore affected by them. As the war worsened, attitudes became more polarized, and even though these NGOs both abhorred the rights violations that occurred, they were both still pulled in the direction of supporting their countrymen, whether it was only a little or a lot. Successful war requires ultranationalism, and even the most respectable NGOs cannot resist its pull.

 

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