I. A Closer Look
The last person I ever expected to befriend in the remote Tibetan Himalayas with was a convict. His name was Basaang. Basaang was a convict, and he also happened to be my guide. While we were between Chinese checkpoints, he began telling me the story about how he ended up in jail. His explanation was one that threw me out of my naivety. Basaang went to jail for being in a tea house at the same time as a drunk man, who was speaking ill of the Chinese government, and a snitch, who reported the incident. His stint in jail only lasted three days, but he was never informed of how long his imprisonment would be, or what the next legal steps would be. His story is not unique; in fact, it is quite normal in Tibet.
Since 1951, Tibet has been under the autonomous ruling of China. And since then, human rights violations have been committed throughout Tibet under the autonomous rule of China. However, Tibet has always been on the periphery of international concerns. It has always been considered, at minimum, a satellite of China by the West. In the past, Tibet had its own diplomatic ties with other Asian states, but the West and China always saw China and Tibet as two related entities with China having the dominant position in the relationship. Because China is part of the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, once it invaded Tibet, the UN mostly closed its eyes to human rights violations in the autonomous region. The permanent members of the Security Council are unlikely to infringe upon the domestic sovereignty of other permanent members.
II. Historical Background
The conflict between Tibet and China surrounding Tibet’s independence and autonomy has been ongoing for centuries. China always claimed Tibet as being a part of it, while Tibet maintained that its culture and people were fundamentally different from Chinese culture and people. Within Asia, Tibet was looked at as being sovereign—it had its own independent relationships with various countries, such as India and Nepal (Goldstein, 60). However, the West always viewed Tibet as being part of China. Anand writes that “The status of Tibet vis-à-vis China before 1951 has been articulated in terms of various concepts, including sovereignty, suzerainty, independence, indirect rule, autonomy, vassalage, protectorate, overlordship, and colony” and that to the British who were ruling colonial India, “Tibet was a ‘forbidden land’ ruled by ‘strange lamas’ under some form of Chinese political control” (66, 68). Even though Tibet always considered itself independent, its sovereignty was not recognized by many.
In 1950, the Chinese threat of invasion into Tibet became imminent. Since Tibet knew that it would not be capable of withstanding a Chinese invasion, it appealed to the UN for assistance. Tibet described the problem as having “taken on alarming proportions in recent times. The problem is not of Tibet’s own making but is largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambition to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination” (Goldstein, 59). Melvyn Goldstein wrote extensively about the situation in a chapter called Tibet Appeals to the United Nations as part of his multi-volume book on the topic, called A History of Modern Tibet. He writes that many states found it hard to give their support to Tibet because they could not say with certainty if Tibet qualified as a state (Goldstein, 64). Some states, namely Britain, declared Tibet as a state, but India declared that it was not. India did so on the basis that it did not want to threaten its relationship with China by recognizing Tibet as a state, saying that raising this issue now would threaten delicate international relations that were taking place at that time (Goldstein, 67). At the time, China was not yet part of the UN and was trying to obtain a seat in the UN and on the Security Council. Because India declared Tibet as not being state, Britain followed suit, arguing that “‛the best line to take in the United Nations would be to argue that the Tibetan issue was wrapped in ‘legal obscurity’” (Goldstein, 67). This caused other states, such as Australia, the United States, and Russia, to follow in the British and Indian example.
Interestingly, one relatively powerless state did try to defend Tibet. According to Goldstein, El Salvador wrote to the UN, asking for the Tibetan case to be heard before the General Assembly (63). The case was first put before a General Committee to decide if there was warrant for it to be heard by the General Assembly. El Salvador asked for the UN to condemn the actions taken by China, for a special committee o be set up on behalf of Tibet, and for a report on Tibet to be written and presented to the General Assembly “during the present session” (Goldstein, 63). This caused many powerful states, such as India, Britain, and the United States “to weigh their own national interests carefully against their historical connections with Tibet and their moral and legal obligations to assist Tibet at this critical time” (Goldstein, 64). In other words, these states had to decide what was more important to them: Chinese power and a relationship with the Chinese state, or the moral obligation to help a weak state.
The states decided that a relationship with China was more important. China was a global superpower and was about to come into more power once it became part of the UN. Anand writes that “The United States did not want to offend Nationalist China. India saw Tibet mostly as a thorn in the side of Sino - Indian relations. Communist states supported Chinese rights of sovereignty” (82). When this happened, Tibet was left open to Chinese invasion without any strong international support to stop it. Chinese power was seen as more important than Tibetan independence and sovereignty. And once Tibet became part of China, no one in the UN would really want to say anything.
III. On the Lack of Modern Intervention
Since the UN accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet without much question, Tibet has almost universally given lower status. No state was going to question China’s sovereignty over Tibet, at least not with much success, as was seen during El Salvador’s attempt to intervene on behalf of Tibet. China is a global superpower, and it wields extraordinary power, which has been afforded to it as part of the Security Council. However, even if it was not on the Security Council, it seems unlikely that any intervention would ever take place.
Normally, many would argue that the UN has mechanisms through which it could help Tibet, namely the Responsibility to Protect. However, the very institution of the R2P would make it impossible for any action to be taken on behalf of Tibet. The R2P is “empowered to investigate any…dispute and to recommend ‘appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’. It can act under Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) whenever it determines ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’” (Steiner et al, 836). For this to happen, though, the Security Council, specifically the five permanent members, must approve of a decision to intervene. Because China is on the Security Council, it is obvious that no action would ever be taken. China would always veto any decision, and likely so would any other state that supports Chinese power.
Yet even if China did not have this power, it is doubtful that the R2P would be used against China. China is a global hegemon. Bazirake and Bukuluki say in their article A Critical Reflection on the Conceptual and Practical Limitations of the Responsibility to Protect that “the practice in international relations is only proving to provide a more tilted power imbalance that puts the less developed states at the receiving end of various interventionist models” (1018). Since China is a relatively developed state and a very powerful one, it is very unlikely that the R2P would be used against it.
It is interesting to look at what has happened when other states have tried to shame China for their treatment of Tibetans. In 2013, Prime Minister of England David Cameron met with the Dalai Lama—the exiled leader of Tibet—in England (BBC). This angered China, which “halted ministerial meetings with UK counterparts as a result and it was reported recently that Mr Cameron had effectively been barred from visiting the country” (BBC). This caused Cameron to immediately respond that he respects Chinese sovereignty and does not support Tibetan independence (BBC). The situation may appear obsolete, but the simple fact that China’s actions were able to influence such a strong response in favor of China demonstrates the power that China wields over other states. Any time any other state even appears to attempt to question China’s sovereignty over Tibet, China stops them from doing so.
When looking at the human rights violations in Tibet, it is also important to note how Chinese law effects the situation in Tibet. Once Tibet was part of China as an autonomous region, Chinese law made it so that oppressing the Tibetans was legal. The Chinese constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief, but the state values its sovereignty and interests over religious freedom. If the rights and freedoms of Chinese citizens conflicts with the state’s interests, then the state will intervene. Following the interests of the state is deemed more important than individual rights. In the case of Tibet, its tradition of Buddhism was seen by the Chinese as something that the Tibetans would rally around to revolt against the Chinese yoke. Dziedzic writes that “Religious freedom may be protected, but only to the extent that it does not conflict with the interests of the state government. While religious belief is not an obligation of citizens, the Constitution does oblige citizens to follow the policies of the state” (90). Chinese interest is in controlling Tibet. Tibet is very nationalistic and does not want this, and much of its nationalism is based off its strong ties to Buddhism. China uses this to repress the Tibetans.
IV. Conclusions
Being a global hegemon, China wields immense power. Since it claimed Tibet as its own and subsequently made it its own, other states have sided with the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Tibet. China wields such strong power that it would take a monumental effort to get China to change its behavior. However, it seems unlikely that something like this would happen. Every time China detects even the slightest of threats to its sovereignty, it uses its power to shame other states into not acting on behalf of Tibet. Their efforts to shame have worked every time. Global hegemons like China are not threatened by other states, even if they are other supposed global superpowers who are on the Security Council. China’s hegemony allows it to essentially flout international norms and laws because nothing can touch it—not even the R2P. As discussed above, the R2P is only useful against small, powerless states, as stronger, powerful states will not infringe upon each other’s sovereignty. Saving face and maintaining each other’s sovereignty has been decided as being more important than a moral obligation to human rights. Unless this narrative changes and many powerful states were willing to collectively shame China on their human rights record in Tibet, the situation within the autonomous region will remain bleak.
Works Cited
Anand, Dibyesh. “The West and the Identity of ‘Tibet.’” Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination, NED - New edition ed., vol. 30, University of Minnesota Press, 2007, pp. 65–86. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttsd9x.8.
Bazirake, Joseph Besigye and Paul Bukuluki. "A Critical Reflection on the Conceptual and Practical Limitations of the Responsibility to Protect." International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 19, no. 8, Dec. 2015, pp. 1017-1028. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/13642987.2015.1082844
BBC. “China and Tibet: Cameron Says UK Policy Has Not Changed.” BBC News, BBC, 8 May 2013, www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22457242.
Dziedzic, Peter. “Religion Under Fire: A Report and Policy Paper on Religious Freedom in Tibet.” The Tibet Journal, vol. 38, no. 3-4, 2013, pp. 87–113. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/tibetjournal.38.3-4.87.
Goldstein, Melvyn C. “Tibet Appeals to the United Nations.” A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955, 1st ed., University of California Press, 2007, pp. 59–81. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnthq.13.
Steiner, Henry J., et al. International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. Oxford University Press, 2008.